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INTRODUCTION
Textualism has broad support—at the Supreme Court,1 within the
lower federal courts’ new cohort of young “Trump judges,”2 within
many state courts,3 and even within the legal academy.4 Textualism
comes in several variations,5 and a new “populist” version is taking
hold.6 Modern textualists claim to interpret law from the perspective
of an ordinary person,7 which includes giving terms in law their
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1. See Victoria Nourse & William N. Eskridge, Textual Gerrymandering: The Eclipse of
Republican Government in an Era of Statutory Popularism, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1718, 1722 (2021)
(“Should interpreters focus on the readers and consumers of statutes (We the People) or the
authors and producers of statutes (Congress)? . . . On its face, the now-dominant Supreme Court
approach elevates the consumer perspective and belittles or ignores that of the producers. This is
an alarming development.”); Kevin Tobia, Brian Slocum, & Victoria Nourse, Statutory
Interpretation from the Outside, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 216 (2022) (“[O]rdinary meaning is
regularly deployed by all members of the current Supreme Court.”).
2. Jason Zengerle, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courtsjudiciary.html [https://perma.cc/UG99-J2QZ] (President Trump was committed to “nominating
and appointing judges that are committed originalists and textualists.”).
3. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1758 (2010) (“[I]n the states
studied, textualism is more than merely alive and well; it is the controlling interpretive approach—
the consensus methodology chosen by the courts.”).
4. Eric Martínez & Kevin Tobia, The Legal Academy and Theory Survey, (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
5. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 3; Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV.
265, 265 (2020) (comparing “formalistic” and “flexible” forms of textualism).
6. See Nourse & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1723; see also generally Anya Bernstein & Glen
Staszewski, Judicial Populism, 106 MINN. L. REV. 283 (2021) (commenting on judicial populism).
7. Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 435, 440 (2018)
(“Textualism instructs judges to interpret a statute as its addressees would understand it.”); Amy
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ordinary meanings.8 This commitment is taken to promote rule of law
values (e.g. publicity), fair notice, and a “democratic” mode of
interpretation.9 Even non-textualist Justices have begun to appeal to
the “ordinary speaker.”10
How do today’s textualists go about finding ordinary meaning?
They regularly appeal to sources including “dictionaries, corpus
linguistics, and canons of construction.”11 The flexibility of dictionaries
and canons of construction is well-documented.12 Judges can cherrypick helpful dictionary definitions,13 and for many canons of

Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 2195 (2017)
(“[Textualists] view themselves as agents of the people rather than of Congress and as faithful to
the law rather than to the lawgiver”).
8. E.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis: Redux, 70
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 855, 856 (2020) (noting the significance of “ordinary meaning”).
9. See Bernstein, supra note 7, at 442; see also Kevin Tobia, Brian Slocum & Victoria
Nourse, Progressive Textualism, 110 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (documenting modern
textualism’s motivations).
10. Consider Justice Roberts’s recent question in Facebook v. Duguid’s oral argument:
[O]ur objective is to settle upon the most natural meaning of the statutory language to
an ordinary speaker of English, right? . . . So the most probably useful way of settling
all these questions would be to take a poll of 100 ordinary – ordinary speakers of
English and ask them what [the statute] means, right?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51–52, Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163 (2021) (No. 19511). Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion in Duguid, noted that
[t]he strength and validity of an interpretive canon is an empirical question, and
perhaps someday it will be possible to evaluate these canons by conducting what is
called a corpus linguistics analysis, that is, an analysis of how particular combinations
of words are used in a vast database of English prose.
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. at 1174 (Alito, J., concurring).
11. Nourse & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1727.
12. On canons, see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)
(“[T]here are two opposing canons on almost every point.”); see also generally Anita
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016); Anita Krishnakumar & Victoria
Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. REV. 163 (2018); Ryan Doerfler, Late-Stage Textualism, 2022
SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2022). On dictionaries, see generally Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey
L. Kirschmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of
Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999); Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress:
Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1915
(2010); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 227 (1998); James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV 483 (2013).
13. Aprill, supra note 12, at 300 (“[O]pinions often cite or rely on only one definition in only
one dictionary . . . . For the most part, opinions fail to explain or justify the basis for their
choice.”); Brudney & Baum, supra note 12, at 491 (arguing that the Supreme Court has a
“tendency to cherry-pick definitions that support results reached on other grounds”); Kevin
Tobia, Brian Slocum & Victoria Nourse, Ordinary Meaning and Ordinary People, 171 U. PA. L.

148

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 71:146

interpretation, there is an opposing canon that could support the
opposite result.
This essay explores textualism’s newest tool: corpus linguistics.
Over the past five years, the tool has been increasingly employed by
U.S. courts.14 Legal corpus linguistics has also caught the attention of
the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Thomas mentioned corpus linguistics
in his 2018 Carpenter dissent, and Justice Alito noted it again in his
2021 Duguid concurrence.15 Most recently, Justices Roberts and
Barrett discussed corpus linguistics in a 2022 oral argument.16
Broadly speaking, legal corpus linguistics treats collections of texts
(“corpora”) as data.17 To learn about the ordinary meaning of a
statutory or constitutional term (e.g. “commerce”), a textualist would
evaluate how that term is commonly used in different written sources
(e.g. books) and what other words tend to appear near it in those
sources. For example, the interpreter might consider different senses
of a term (e.g. “commerce” in the narrow sense of “the trading . . . and
selling of goods,” versus “commerce” in the broader sense of “all forms
of social and economic intercourse”).18 Next, the interpreter could
evaluate how often each of those senses appears in the corpus. Perhaps,
for example, a scholar may find that the narrower trade sense appears
more frequently than the broader sense. Some scholars suggest that
these data evince the constitutional or statutory meaning of the term.
For example, a recent article suggests that corpus linguistics data about
“commerce” “at least arguably, tells us that the original [constitutional]
meaning of commerce is the trade sense of the term.”19
The essay argues that corpus linguistics—an important and useful
method in linguistics—is unlikely to achieve textualist’s theoretical
aims. Many have criticized legal corpus linguistics’ prospects,
REV. (forthcoming 2023) (documenting the Supreme Court’s citation of dozens of ordinary and
legal dictionaries).
14. Kevin Tobia, The Corpus and the Courts, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (2021) (documenting
judge’s appeals to corpus linguistics, rising sharply over the past five years).
15. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1175 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring).
16. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–11, ZF Automotive U.S., Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. (2022)
(No. 21-401).
17. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788,
795 (2018) (“Corpus linguists study language through data derived from large bodies—corpora—
of naturally occurring language.”).
18. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261,
300 (2019).
19. Id. at 323.
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cautioning that judges do not have the training or expertise to employ
the tool or pointing to fundamental flaws of the current method, as
applied to legal debates.20 This essay starts from a different perspective,
noting that judges are already employing and referencing corpus
linguistics in legal interpretation,21 as scholars advance provocative
corpus linguistics arguments about statutory and constitutional
language.22
Corpus linguistics has been offered as a preferred interpretive tool,
avoiding the pitfalls of dueling canons or cherry-picked dictionary
definitions.23 However, this essay proposes, there is one important
commonality among textualists’ current use of dictionaries, canons,
and legal corpus linguistics: Flexibility. The essay articulates ten
emerging “arguments” and “counterarguments” of legal corpus
linguistics. Alongside the pitfalls of dueling canons and dueling
dictionaries, legal interpreters should be aware of the similar possibility
of “clashing corpora.” Corpus linguistics can greatly enrich our
understanding of language and cognition, but—at least in the form
employed by textualist judges and commentators—it does not provide
inexorable determinations of how ordinary people understand legal
language in contested cases of legal interpretation.

20. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 7; Anya Bernstein, What Counts as Data?, 86 BROOK. L.
REV. 435 (2021); Anya Bernstein, Legal Corpus Linguistics and the Half-Empirical Attitude, 106
CORNELL L. REV. 1397 (2021); John S. Ehrett, Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L.J. ONLINE
50 (2019); Ethan J. Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing
Ordinary Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112 (2017); Donald L.
Drakeman, Is Corpus Linguistics Better than Flipping a Coin?, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 81 (2020);
Stanley Fish, The Interpretive Poverty of Data, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 2, 2018)
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/03/the-interpretive-poverty-of-data.html
[https://perma.cc/4X4S-7QZ8]; Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law,
2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1503 (2018); Brian G. Slocum & Stefan Th. Gries, Judging Corpus
Linguistics, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 13 (2020); Kevin Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning,
134 HARV. L. REV. 726 (2020); Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity,
50 SETON HALL L. REV. 401 (2019). But see Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Corpus
and the Critics, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 275 (2021) (defending legal corpus linguistics).
21. Tobia, supra note 14 (documenting judge’s appeals to corpus linguistics, rising sharply
over the past five years).
22. E.g., Lee & Phillips, supra note 18, at 300–11 (providing a corpus linguistic analysis of
“commerce”).
23. E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 17, at 877 (suggesting that corpus linguistics offers
better evidence of ordinary meaning than dictionaries).
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I. POPULAR TEXTUALISM
Today’s textualism is popular in two different senses. First, it has
significant support from judges and scholars.24 (That said, it is not
universally approved; modern critics lambast textualist practice as
flawed25 and even “bogus.”26). Today’s textualism is also “popular” in
a second sense: its interpretive inquiry is focused on the public.27 As
Justice Barrett puts it, modern textualists “view themselves as agents
of the people rather than of Congress and as faithful to the law rather
than to the lawgiver.”28 Textualists thus “approach language from the
perspective of an ordinary English speaker.”29 Judges increasingly
adopt this popular stance, committing to interpret statutory and
constitutional language empirically, in line with its “ordinary” or
“public” meaning.30
How does one find “ordinary public meaning”?31 Textualists
appeal to linguistic evidence, like dictionary definitions.32
Commentators question that approach. Differing definitions allow
judges to go “dictionary-shopping,”33 and empirical studies suggest that
judges’ dictionary use is often “ad hoc and subjective.”34
“Picking and choosing” is a broader issue for textualists.
Traditionally, textualism has aimed to constrain legal interpretation

24. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
25. E.g., Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice Scalia, 70
ALA. L. REV. 667 (2019).
26. Mitchell N. Berman & Guha Krishnamurthi, Bostock was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism,
and Title VII, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 67 (2021).
27. Bernstein & Staszewski, supra note 6, at 287 (“[T]he brand of populism we address
here . . . makes claims justifying action in the name of ‘the people.’”).
28. Barrett, supra note 7, at 2195.
29. Id. at 2194.
30. E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion,
and the Constitutional Record, 2017 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1621 (2018).
31. This phrase, appearing in Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020), reflects
the synthesis of textualist’s ordinary meaning and originalist’s public meaning. As Victoria Nourse
documents, “new” textualists are statutory originalists. Nourse, supra note 25, at 669.
32. Thumma & Kirschmeier, supra note 12, at 260–62 (documenting dictionary usage by
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court); Mouritsen, supra note 12, at 1918 (noting the “overarching
trend to rely upon dictionaries to resolve lexical ambiguity”).
33. Aprill, supra note 12, at 318 (arguing that Justice Scalia sometimes treats dictionary
definitions as authoritative, but other times rejects dictionary definitions).
34. Brudney & Baum, supra note 12, at 483 (“[T]he Court’s patterns of dictionary usage
reflect a casual form of opportunistic conduct.”).
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and limit judicial discretion.35 For example, textualists offer the
limitation of judicial discretion as one reason for courts to avoid
evaluating legislative intent.36 With respect to legislative history, many
textualists seek to avoid judge’s freedom to pick and choose their
friends among the crowd. But recent critics note that textualist
themselves can pick and choose what text to analyze,37 pick and choose
dictionaries,38 and pick and choose definitions.39 Textualists also choose
among canons, “hundreds of interpretive presumptions that have no
hierarchy among them.”40 The dueling canons and “dueling
dictionaries” show that a mere commitment to “text” does not
guarantee limited judicial discretion.
II. LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Enter “legal corpus linguistics,” an exciting new tool for textualists
and other theorists committed to ordinary meaning.41 Corpora (the
plural of “corpus”) are samples of language-usage.42 To learn about the
ordinary or public meaning of a term like “commerce” or “bear arms,”
interpreters might look beyond just a few dictionaries, to hundreds of
uses of the phrase in a corpus. For example, a search of the Corpus of
Founding Era American English revealed 281 instances of the phrase
“bear arms.” “[O]nly a handful don’t refer to war, soldiering or
organized armed action,” suggesting to some that “the natural meaning
of ‘bear arms’ in the framers’ day was military.”43 With an appeal to
35. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
74–75 (2006).
36. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1289 (2010).
37. Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons for Statutory Interpretation from
the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409, 1423–29 (2017); Nourse & Eskridge, supra
note 1, at 1747–51.
38. Brudney & Baum, supra note 12, at 529–31.
39. Brudney & Baum, supra note 12, at 529–31.
40. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in
the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 62 (2015); see also Llewellyn, supra
note 12, at 401 (“[T]here are two opposing canons on almost every point.”).
41. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 17, at 795.
42. Jesse Egbert, The Corpus—A Sample By Another Name, LINGUISTICS WITH A CORPUS
(May 27, 2021), https://linguisticswithacorpus.wordpress.com/2021/05/27/the-corpus-a-sampleby-another-name/ [https://perma.cc/W3ND-YKQK].
43. Dennis Baron, Opinion: Antonin Scalia Was Wrong About the Meaning of “Bear Arms.”
WASH. POST. (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/antonin-scalia-waswrong-about-the-meaning-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/9243ac66-5d11-11e8-b2b808a538d9dbd6_story.html [https://perma.cc/E2FA-QMFW]; see also Dennis Baron, Corpus
Evidence Illuminates the Meaning of Bear Arms, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 510 (2019);
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“big data,” legal corpus linguistics offers a new, and perhaps more
objective and empirically robust, basis to seek “ordinary meaning.”
Despite its promise, legal corpus linguistics approach has faced
criticism.44 Yet, over the past decade, scholars and judges have adopted
corpus linguistic tools to address questions about public meaning. This
trend is sharp in the past five years, with citation to corpus linguistics
from several state and federal courts.45 Scholars have advanced new
corpus linguistics arguments about constitutional language including
“commerce,”46 and in 2018, Justice Thomas cited corpus linguistics
evidence about the meaning of “search” at the U.S. Supreme Court.47
As legal corpus linguistics gains prominence, one of its primary
concerns should be its political (non-)neutrality and potential for
abuse. Some critics accuse textualist theory to be more motivated by
conservatism than fidelity to democracy or separation of powers,48
suggesting textualism is a mere “smokescreen by conservative judges
to reach ideologically acceptable outcomes.”49 A similar concern
applies to textualist tools, including legal corpus linguistics. Thus far,
legal corpus linguistics has been discussed more frequently (and
favorably) by Republican-appointed judges than by Democraticappointed ones.50
But some legal corpus linguistics research appears to have the
opposite valence. For example, some of the most robust legal corpus
Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Semantics and the Meaning of the Second Amendment, PANORAMA
(Aug. 3, 2018), http://thepanorama.shear.org/2018/08/03/historical-semantics-and-the-meaningof-the-second-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/5WKC-S4AY]; Josh Jones, Note, The
“Weaponization” of Corpus Linguistics: Testing Heller’s Linguistic Claims, 34 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L.
135, 135 (2020). But see James C. Phillips & Josh Blackman, Corpus Linguistics and Heller, 56
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 609 (2021).
44. See supra note 20.
45. Tobia, supra note 14.
46. Lee & Phillips, supra note 18, at 300–11.
47. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238 n.4 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2063,
2065 (2005) (“I believe that the underlying motivation of textualism derives from a
neoconservative conception of the regulatory state, much more so, anyway, than from a concern
with principles of democracy and separation of powers.”).
49. Grove, supra note 5, at 266 (Grove does not endorse this idea, but cites others who do,
including Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A Tale of Two Formalisms: How Law and
Economics Mirrors Originalism and Textualism, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 591, 640 (2020)
(suggesting that textualism is “a rhetorical smokescreen for extremely conservative results”));
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term — Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 77 (1994); Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory
Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 851 (2013)).
50. Tobia, supra note 14.
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linguistics research, from a number of scholars, questions the
conclusions of Heller, finding that, “the Supreme Court’s reasoning
may be flawed.”51 The Second Amendment is an alluring test case: Can
legal corpus linguistics attain textualism’s promise of objectivity, and
will commentators and judges persuaded by corpus linguistics evidence
concerning “commerce” and “search” be similarly moved by evidence
about “bear arms”?
As an example, consider a recent case. In Jones v. Becerra
(concerning a Second Amendment challenge to California’s ban on
firearm purchases by those between age 18 and 21), the Ninth Circuit
ordered supplemental briefing concerning legal corpus linguistics and
the Second Amendment. Specifically, the parties were instructed to
address the “original public meaning” of the phrases: “A well regulated
Militia”; “the right of the people”; and “shall not be infringed”—and
to address “[h]ow does the tool of corpus linguistics help inform the
determination of the original public meaning of those Second
Amendment phrases?”52
The parties’ responses were striking. Both the plaintiff-appellants
and defendant-appellees criticized the method of corpus linguistics.53
At the same time, both the plaintiff-appellants and defendantappellees conducted corpus linguistic analyses and managed to find
corpus linguistics data to support opposing conclusions about the
original public meaning of the Second Amendment.54

51. Baron, supra note 43; see also Baron, supra note 43; LaCroix, supra note 43; Jones, supra
note 43; Neal Goldfarb, A (Mostly Corpus-Based) Linguistic Reexamination of D.C. v. Heller and
the Second Amendment (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3481474 [https://perma.cc/8E4E-3SE3]. But see Phillips & Blackman,
supra note 43.
52. Jones v. Becerra, Order, Case 20-56174, at 1 (9th Cir. Mar. 26, 2021).
53. Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 2, Jones v. Bonta, 2022 WL 1485187 (9th Cir. 2022)
(No. 20-56174), 2021 WL 1727661, at *2 (“[I]nitial results suggest that a corpus linguistics analysis
would likely be of limited utility in answering [the] question.”); Supplemental Brief for Appellants
at 2–3, Jones v. Bonta, 2022 WL 1485187 (9th Cir. 2022) (No. 20-56174), 2021 WL 1727665, at *2–
*3 (“Because of the weaknesses inherent in the methodology of corpus linguistics, however, it
ultimately sheds little light on the matter—and it certainly can do nothing to upset the
interpretation of the Second Amendment adopted by binding Supreme Court precedent.”).
54. Supplemental Brief for Appellees, Jones v. Bonta, 2022 WL 1485187 (9th Cir. 2022) (No.
20-56174), 2021 WL 1727661, at *25–*26. In their supplemental brief, the Appellees noted that
preliminary searches in COHA and COFEA for the phrase ‘right of the people’ return
a relatively manageable number of hits: approximately 200 in each database. They do
not appear to provide clear evidence that this phrase, as used in the Second
Amendment, was originally understood to protect an individual right for persons under
21 to keep or bear arms (much less to purchase or receive them from a commercial
dealer), however.
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This result is not surprising, but Jones v. Becerra portends a new
time of “clashing corpora.” Like judicial use of dictionaries, judicial use
of corpus linguistics admits of interpretive choice and flexibility. Judges
and advocates have flexibility in terms of which selection from the legal
text to analyze, which corpus or corpora to search, which search(es) to
conduct, and what conclusions to draw from the results returned from
the corpus.
The phenomenon of “dueling dictionaries” is well-known. But this
essay concludes by sketching some of the emerging “moves” of legal
corpus linguistic argumentation (inspired by the style of Llewellyn’s
dueling canons).55
Argument

But

Counterargument

1. The corpus data supports
that the term ordinarily
reflects this meaning; so this is
its public meaning.56

1. The term is a legal term of
art and should be given its
legal meaning, that meaning.57

2. The corpus reveals that the
term is always used in this
sense; this is its public
meaning.

2. A corpus is not exhaustive
of ordinary understanding;
the meaning might not be this
sense.

Id.; Supplemental Brief for Appellants, Jones v. Bonta, 2022 WL 1485187 (9th Cir. 2022) (No. 2056174), 2021 WL 1727665, at *2 (“We have conducted a corpus-linguistics analysis of the three
phrases identified by the Court, and we set forth the results below—results that are fully
consistent with the conventional evidence of the original public meaning of those phrases (and
with the determinations in Heller).”).
55. Llewellyn, supra note 12, at 401–06. Here, thrust and parry 1 is nearly identical to
Llewellyn’s pair concerning ordinary versus legal meaning. Here, the thrust and parry arguments
imply conflicting, although not necessarily opposite, conclusions.
56. See Vermont v. Misch, 256 A.3d 519, 530 (Vt. 2021) (“Analyzing these databases . . .
several studies have reviewed hundreds of instances of ‘bear arms’ and found that the phrase was
overwhelmingly used in a collective or military sense.”).
57. This counterargument could be offered on the basis of precedent or common law, but
could also be supported with corpus linguistics evidence. For a compelling example, see Lawrence
Solan & Tammy Gales, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpretation: Is a Minister a
Laborer?, 36 GA. ST. L. REV. 491, 505–513 (2020) (stating that “[t]he term ‘labor or service’ may
not be a matter of ordinary meaning at all but may rather be a legal term of art” and examining a
corpus of statutory language).
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3. The corpus reveals that the
term was never used in that
sense; that cannot possibly be
its meaning.58

3. See Counterargument 2.
Absent evidence is not
evidence of absence.

4. The corpus reveals that,
generally, the term is (most)
frequently used in this sense;
this is its meaning.59

4. Given the full context of
the legal text, the term takes
that sense.60

5. The corpus reveals that, in
the relevant context, the term
is (most) frequently used in
this sense; this is its meaning.61

5. The “context” shared by
the examples of language-use
in the corpus is not
adequately similar to that of
the statutory context. 62

6. The corpus shows that this
is at least a possible sense of
the term, a candidate for its
ordinary meaning.63

6. Some language-use is
figurative,
metaphorical,
sarcastic, or otherwise inapt
as
evidence
of
public
meaning; this is not be a
possible meaning in the legal
text.64

58. E.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“At the founding, ‘search’
did not mean a violative of someone’s reasonable expectation of privacy . . . . The phrase
‘expectation(s) of privacy’ does not appear in . . . collections of early American English texts.”).
59. E.g., Lee & Phillips, supra note 18, at 300–11 (illustrating the concept using
“commerce”).
60. A classic example is Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241–
46 (1993) (arguing that offering a firearm in exchange for cocaine does not fit within the statutory
language of “using” a firearm, since the broader context of “using a firearm” expresses “using a
firearm as a weapon,” not any possible “use,” broadly construed).
61. E.g., United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (using Google News
to assess how “harbor” is used with a human object, concluding that it most often implies hiding
the human).
62. E.g., Phillips & Blackman, supra note 43, at 672 (acknowledging that one possible
response to their corpus analyses is that the relevant phrase might have a different meaning in
different contexts); see also id. at 680 (calling for analysis of words and phrases in only the
“appropriate context”).
63. E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 17, at 828–29.
64. See generally Raymond Gibbs & Herbert Colston, Figurative Language, in HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 835 (Matthew Traxler & Morton Gernsbacher ed., 2006).
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7. The corpus shows that a
term often appears with
“this” and rarely with “that”;
thus, this is more informative
than that of the term’s public
meaning.65

7. Co-location frequency of
“this” over “that” does not
always imply that this is more
central to the term’s meaning;
in fact, it could imply the
opposite.66

8. The corpus provides
evidence about the meaning
of multi-word expressions by
providing evidence about the
meaning of each individual
word.

8. Meanings of expressions
are not always the simple sum
of their parts.67

9. The corpus provides
evidence about the meaning
of sentences by providing
evidence about the meaning
of each word and expression
in that sentence.

9. Meanings of sentences are
not always the simple sum of
their parts.68

10. Corpus evidence about
“this” is not evidence of
public meaning, where the
corpus over-represents elite
writers, and thus elite
meaning.69

10. Without good reason to
think elite writings diverge
relevantly from non-elite
ones with respect to “this,”
corpus evidence from the
former provides evidence

65. E.g., Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 17, at 839 (describing common collocates as
informative of a term’s ordinary meaning).
66. Language Bias and Black Sheep, NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING BLOG (June 24,
2016), https://nlpers.blogspot.com/2016/06/language-bias-and-black-sheep.html
[https://perma.cc/T7C2-TFMB] (noting that, often in writing, “black” appears more frequently
than “white” before “sheep”).
67. Solan & Gales, supra note 57, at 505–13 (considering the meaning of “labor or service”);
Smith, 508 U.S. at 241–46 (considering the meaning of “uses a firearm”).
68. See generally Peter Hagoort & Jos van Berkum, Beyond the Sentence Given, 362 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. B 801 (2007) (presenting evidence against a simple two-step
compositional model of sentence representation); see also generally Nourse & Eskridge, supra
note 1 (arguing that textualists inappropriately strip statutory language out of its statutory context
and define individual terms (in a different context)).
69. Anya Bernstein, More Than Words, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L. BLOG (July 7, 2021),
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2021/07/more-than-words/ [https://perma.cc/9JHU-FEXE].
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To enumerate these clashing arguments is not to endorse or
discredit any particular one. It is simply to question the legal corpus
linguistics (and textualist) claim that the introduction of these new
empirical methods will straightforwardly constrain legal interpreters or
provide uncontroversial answers to hard interpretive questions.
To be sure, where textualists aim to uncover how ordinary people
understand language, legal corpus linguistics seems no less promising
than dictionaries, canons, intuition, and other textualist tools. But
where textualists can freely leverage any of these arguments and
counterarguments (and pick and choose which text to analyze and
searches to run71), legal corpus linguistics is unlikely to provide much
more predictability or constraint.
CONCLUSION
Legal corpus linguistics is not yet “popular” in the sense of
receiving widespread approval.72 And it is not necessarily “popular” in
the sense of relating to the ordinary public; the historical corpora that
legal scholars have most often relied upon tend to overrepresent elites’
language.73 But legal corpus linguistics is popular in the sense of being
increasingly encountered—cited by commentators and judges as
70. See, e.g., Dennis Baron, Corpus Linguistics, Public Meaning, and the Second
Amendment,
DUKE
CTR.
FOR
FIREARMS
L.
BLOG
(July
12,
2021),
https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2021/07/corpus-linguistics-public-meaning-and-the-secondamendment/ [https://perma.cc/7CB9-EUZC]. Baron suggested this line of argument with respect
to the meaning of “bear arms”:
It’s true that ordinary people didn’t write as much as the framers. But there’s no proof
that ordinary people in the federal period said they were bearing arms when they
hunted deer, elk, buffaloes, or rabbits. Nor is there any evidence that elite writers like
Madison and the members of Congress who carefully edited and revised the Second
Amendment baked a non-elite, non-military sense of bear arms into the amendment as
a concession to an unattested ‘ordinary’ usage.
Id.
71. See, e.g., Nourse & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1721 (“As this Article suggests, in any
difficult case, the textualist judge starts with two potentially outcome-determinative decisions: a
choice of text—the scope of text the judge decides to focus on when interpreting a statute—and a
choice of context surrounding this text.”).
72. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
73. See Bernstein, supra note 69 (noting that a popular corpus of founding era language
represents a “tiny minority” of the founding era population, consisting of the language of
“political superstars, lawmakers and government agents, [and] a few legal scholars.”).
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relevant to the public meaning of “commerce,” “search,” and maybe
even “bear arms.”74
This essay has argued that legal corpus linguistics is unlikely to
provide easy answers in hard cases of interpretation. Will the fact that
legal corpus linguistics often admits of “clashing” arguments sap its
popularity? It is unlikely. For one, that an interpretive tool could
support putatively clashing arguments does not imply that the tool is
ultimately flawed—perhaps the clashes can be resolved. Some argue
that legal corpus linguistics’ current problems are largely the result of
proponents’ presentation of a “highly impoverished version of [corpus
linguistics]” and caution that legal scholars and judges should avoid
“reduc[ing it] to the point of caricature.”75 As legal corpus linguistics
develops, perhaps the judges and scholars who rely upon these tools
will clarify the appropriate methodological moves.
But even if the clashing is more fundamental, I would bet that legal
corpus linguistics is here to stay. Despite its critics, textualism is
increasingly influential at the Supreme Court and lower courts.76 And
textualist argument requires apparent textualist evidence.
Perhaps “clashing corpora” will share the fate of the “dueling
canons” and “dueling dictionaries.” It’s been seventy years since
Llewellyn noted the “dueling canons” and at least twenty years since
the observation of “dueling dictionaries.” Today’s Supreme Court
regularly relies on both tools.77

74. See also Tobia, supra note 14 (documenting judge’s appeals to corpus linguistics, rising
sharply over the past five years).
75. Stefan Th. Gries, Corpus Linguistics and the Law: Extending the Field from a Statistical
Perspective, 86 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 324 (2021).
76. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
77. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Cracking the Whole Code Rule, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 97 (2021)
(reporting that the Roberts court relies on language and grammar canons in 8.7% of statutory
meaning cases, substantive canons in 14.9% of such cases, and dictionaries in 21.6% of such cases).

